The Transformation of Development Cooperation from Rome to Busan

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An Insight on Aid Effectiveness from the Perspective of Civil Society Organisations

Supervisor: Urs Heierli, Ph.D.

Names: Raphael Graser (05608260)

Max Fehrmann (12621405)

Jeremy Kaufmann (08604324)

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List of Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AS	Alliance Sud
BACG	BetterAid Coordinating Group
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South America
CPDE	CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
EDD	European Development Days
EDM	Enfants du Monde
GCAP	Global Call to Action against Poverty
HEKS	Swiss Interchurch Aid
HLF	High Level Forum
ICTSD	International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDGs	UN Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SECO	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Acknowledgements

Introduction

The ascendance of development cooperation dates back to the early 1960s – a period of post-war optimism and enthusiasm (OECD, n.d. a). However, during the cold war aid was often directed towards allies and little attention was paid to whether these countries were well governed. When the USSR collapsed, it became evident that other factors are more important with regard to development cooperation; aid effectiveness edged closer to the spotlight. With the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, aid effectiveness gathered steam (ibid.). Much has happened since then. To improve the effectiveness of aid, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) initiated four High Level Forums (HLF) between 2003 and 2011. One of the outcomes of these development conferences was the acknowledgement of the importance of country (or democratic) ownership of the recipient country over the aid agenda. In this regard the importance of civil society organisations (CSOs) – functioning as the cutting point between governments and citizens – was stressed. It is in this light that this paper seeks to enter the debate surrounding aid effectiveness. To be more specific, it is the twofold aim of this work to assess (i) the extent to which (Swiss) CSOs are integrated into the implementation process of ensuring the ownership principle, in order to (ii) identify key implications for the Swiss development cooperation in rectifying the unfinished aid agenda. In this regard, major attention also rests on the supporting roles of mutual accountability and the use of country systems for the attainment of the ownership principle.

To achieve these aims, a tripartite structure is adopted. In a first step a short synopsis of the OECDs HLFs as well as an overview of the (Swiss) development landscape will be provided. Subsequently, the paper illuminates the current situation of the unfinished agenda from the standpoint of Swiss CSOs. This section is mainly based on conducted interviews and focuses especially on mutual accountability and the use of country systems to strengthen the ownership principle.

Finally, based on the insights gathered in the previous section, implications for the Swiss development cooperation will be derived. In the end it will become clear that (Swiss) CSOs are often not as integrated into the development process as foreseen by international agreements. Important factors are, among other things, a lack of resources or the unwillingness of (recipient) governments to be monitored. It consequently follows that efforts to create an enabling environment for CSOs have to be increased substantially.

1.   The History of Aid Effectiveness – from Rome to Busan

In 2003, the OECD initiated the *First High Level Forum*, an international conference in Rome, Italy, where representatives of more than 28 aid recipient countries and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral development institutions reaffirmed their "commitment to eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth, and promoting sustainable development as we advance to an inclusive and equitable global economic system" (Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, 2003, p. 10). Harmonisation of policies, procedures and practices of donor institutions with the agenda of recipient countries lie at the heart of the so called *Rome Declaration*. In addition, the importance of a stronger leadership role for recipient countries, country based approaches and the encouragement of good practices were emphasised (ibid., p. 10). Thus, the Rome Declaration proposed clear principles for aid effectiveness. Yet, while ownership was highlighted, it was limited to governments – CSOs were not recognised as actors in their own right. Overall, the outcome of the Rome HLF was narrowly focused on technical and procedural aspects of aid (Tujan, 2013).

While after the Rome HLF some progress in harmonising aid was made, development aid still focused too much on donor interests. Similarly, ownership was not very prominent – most of the aid was administered through donor channels. With the intention for improvement, a *Second High Level Forum* took place in 2005, in Paris, France. During this second HLF an action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development was endorsed (OECD, n.d. a). This roadmap, together with five concrete principles, which build on the Rome Declaration, constitutes the quintessence of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. Those principles are:

1. Ownership: Developing countries have to set and lead their own strategies for poverty reduction, administer their own development work on the ground and tackle corruption. The role of donors is of supportive nature, focusing on capability strengthening of the developing country.

2. Alignment: Donors must adapt their aid to the developing countries objectives. In addition, donors have to make use of local country systems and procedures for administering aid. Where those systems are not sophisticated enough, donors help strengthening them.

3. Harmonisation: Donor countries commit to avoid duplication of aid. For this end, they coordinate, share information and simplify procedures.

4. Results: Donors and developing countries focus on the result of aid (i.e. the difference the aid makes for poor people).

5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners[1] are accountable to each other for development results (this includes parliaments as well as citizens) (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005; OECD, n.d. a).

While ownership was the central point of the Paris Declaration, vital aspects to ensure the effectiveness of aid also stem from mutual accountability and focusing on results (OECD, n.d. b). To this end, Paris produced a set of 12 indicators in order to measure progress and to hold partners accountable. Each indicator had a specific target and was expected to be achieved by 2010 (Oxfam International, 2012, p. 2).

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[1] Please note that the terms developing country, partner/partner country and recipient country are used interchangeably in this paper.

Even though the Paris HLF expanded the scope of aid effectiveness, it merely focused on improving the delivery of aid, rather than addressing and improving the conditions to effectively reduce poverty and inequality (Tujan, 2013). Thus, in order to review progress made since Paris, to address current challenges and to deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration, in 2008 the third HLF was launched in Accra, Ghana (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, p. 1). The *Accra Agenda for Action* (AAA) concentrated on three aspects, which needed to be addressed in order to accelerate progress on aid effectiveness. Those are:

1. Country Ownership: The leadership role of developing countries for their own development should be strengthened. Governments, parliaments and citizens together should shape these policies. Donors in turn have to support the developing countries, invest in their human resources and increase the predictability of aid flows.

2. Inclusive Partnerships: All development actors – middle income countries, global funds, the private sector and CSOs – together will work in more inclusive partnerships in order to increase aid effectiveness.

3. Delivering results: Since citizens and tax payers expect measurable results from development aid, accountability between development actors, parliaments and governing bodies is emphasised to achieve tangible outcomes (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, pp. 1-2).

Rome and Paris clearly focused on governments when stressing the importance of country ownership. In Accra, the need for a multi-stakeholder framework was spelled out for the first time. In practice, this entailed the creation of an "enabling environment for civil society organisations". Therefore, the "traditional" development actors committed to create rights and laws for CSOs, in order to promote their participation in the development sector as independent actors (Gindroz, 2013). This step has to be seen as a major and inevitable shift towards a more inclusive and sustainable process to enhance aid effectiveness (Schneider, 2013).

The impact of this development was twofold: (i) governments of partner countries had (and still have) to accept CSO activity in their countries and integrate them into the development process and (ii) CSOs gained the possibility to launch partnerships with local organisations and the population to work towards their empowerment vis-à-vis their governments (Gindroz, 2013). In sum, ownership became more inclusive as the term widened to include also parliaments, local authorities and CSOs (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, p. 2; Tujan, 2013). Since the Accra HLF, hundreds of CSOs collaborated through the Better Aid Platform to bring about significant reforms in development cooperation (Tujan, 2013).

Even though both Paris and Accra stipulated a concrete and ambitious agenda, results were slow to come (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, p. 3). In tandem to poor performance, the development landscape changed. Traditional channels of North-South cooperation were augmented by an ascendance of South-South cooperation, including China, India or Brazil (ibid, p. 3). To address these issues and to tack stock of the progress made thus far, a fourth HLF was initiated, which took place at the end of 2011 in Busan, South Korea. The Busan HLF constituted the first event where CSOs were actively involved in both the preparation of and the negotiations during a HLF (Tujan, 2013). At the Forum, all actors agreed that "in the face of the recent financial, security, food, health, climate and energy crises, and to meet the Millennium Development Goals, the development community must do more" (OECD, n.d. a). Only one of the 13 targets that were proposed in Paris had been accomplished, namely the way coordination of technical cooperation was done (Oxfam International, 2012, p.3). It was clear that the development framework had to be adjusted. Thus, during the Busan HLF the importance of non-state actors was explicitly mentioned and the distinct roles that all stakeholders can play to support development has been acknowledged (Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011, p. 2). In addition, the importance of South-South co-operation was stressed in Busan for the first time (ibid., p.2).

Busan spelled out four shared principles, which concurrently form the basis for development cooperation. The principles are:

1. Ownership of development priorities by developing countries: Development partnerships need to be administered by developing countries and tailored to country-specific situations and needs.

2. Focus on results: Development aid must have a lasting impact on poverty mitigation and inequality reduction, as well as on sustainable development and the enhancement of developing countries' capacities.

3. Inclusive development partnerships: Trust, respect and openness as well as the recognition of the roles of all actors are essential for effective partnerships.

4. Transparency and accountability to each other: Accountability to citizens, partners, organisations, constituents and shareholders is vital to delivering results. Transparency constitutes the cornerstone for enhanced accountability (ibid., p. 3).

Stating these four principles was a necessity because former recipient countries, such as Brazil, India or China, increasingly function as donors as well. It was hence important to create a level-playing-field regarding aid effectiveness principles for all development actors. Old donors renewed their promise to eventually implement those principles in full and thereby resolve the unfinished aid agenda. Southern providers expressed their willingness to adhere to the principles on a voluntary basis (Oxfam International, 2012, p. 5). While the principles of ownership, results and accountability were already introduced in the Paris Declaration, inclusive partnership and transparency have not been on the agenda pre-Busan – their ascendance represented a new phase in development cooperation (ibid., p. 5). What is more, not only the OECD but also the full UN system supports the Busan Partnership (ibid., p. 4). Conclusively it can be said that Busan shifted the focus from aid effectiveness to a broader concept of development effectiveness, in which the importance of civil society, South-South cooperation, public-private partnerships and (local) parliaments is acknowledged. This shift, at least from the viewpoint of the co-chair of BetterAid, Antonio Tujan, is the result of successful lobbying on the account of CSOs (Tujan, 2013).

The challenge to come now lies in the implementation of commitments made in Busan (Gindroz, 2013; Schneider, 2013). For CSOs this entails the active pursuit of opportunities for engagement of multi-stakeholder spaces at regional, national and global levels (ibid.). However, before the paper turns to these future challenges and implications for the (Swiss) development cooperation, selected CSOs that have been interviewed for this paper will shortly be introduced.

2. Introducing Interviewed Civil Society Organisations

This section addresses those (Swiss) CSOs in the realm of development cooperation that have been interviewed for this paper. It has to be noted that this section is thus neither all-encompassing, nor does it present the only important CSO actors with regards to development cooperation. A variety of CSOs were not responsive to interview requests. Others declined, arguing that they are not sufficiently engaged with the aid effectiveness agenda. Henceforward, only those CSOs that were insightful for this paper are addressed in this section. As the focus of this paper lies on the Swiss development landscape, it follows that the majority of introduced actors are Swiss CSOs.

Alliance Sud

Alliance Sud (AS) is an alliance of leading Swiss development organisations, which was established in 1969. It has 18 employees at three locations: the head office is located in Berne. Additionally, two regional offices exist in Lausanne and Lugano (Alliance Sud, 2009c). AS represents SWISSAID, Fastenopfer - Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund, Bread for all, Helvetas Swiss Incorporation, Caritas and Interchurch Aid (HEKS). The organisation is supported by Solidar Suisse and Terre des Hommes Suisse (Alliance Sud, 2009b).

AS conducts lobbying for development polices with the aim to shape Swiss policies to the benefit of poor countries and their peoples. Its main goals are sustainable development and a "more just, peaceful and environment-friendly world that offers equal rights and opportunities to all". Core concerns encompass also: (i) reformation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to ensure fair trading relations, (ii) debt relief for developing countries, (iii) an encompassing and binding water convention that ensures the right to clean drinking water for all, (iv) new regulations for the international financial markets to prevent further financial crises as well as the taxation of international capital transactions. To achieve these goals, AS monitors Swiss policies in all areas that affect developing countries and formulates alternatives such as bilateral foreign, economic and trade agreements. It also attempts to influence Switzerland's policies in international organisations such as the World Bank (WB), the WTO or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, AS engages in public relations in the form of press conferences, meetings and publications (Alliance Sud, 2009a; Alliance Sud, 2004).

In addition, Alliance Sud cooperates with several organisations in Switzerland and abroad. Swiss partners are, for example, the Max Havelaar Foundation, Humanrights.ch, the Swiss section of Amnesty International and the Berne Declaration. Furthermore, on the state level the organisation cooperates with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the Swiss Development Cooperation. Lastly, international cooperation's exist inter alia with the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), Social Watch, International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and DevelopmentPortal.eu[2]. In the following, the six member organisations of AS are shortly introduced individually[3].

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[2] For a list of all partners visit http://www.alliancesud.ch/en/about-us/partner-organisations
[3] Please note that from the six AS member organisations only Helvetas, as the largest Swiss CSO, has been interviewed individually (in addition to AS). Information about the other five organisations is provided due to the fact that AS, as the umbrella organisation, represents those CSOs. Thus, it appears instructive to deliver information on these organisations to get an insightful look at the Swiss development landscape as they actually constitute AS.

SWISSAID (AS network)

SWISSAID evolved out of the "Schweizer Spende" an emergency aid providing agency, which was founded in 1947 (SWISSAID, n.d. b). The organisation's operating revenue is approximately CHF 16 million, 36% of which is contributed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (SWISSAID, n.d. a). SWISSAID aims at preventing hunger, strengthening ecologically sustainable agriculture, securing water supply, focuses on local empowerment of people and gender equality. The organisation has 132 employees worldwide (31 of whom work in Switzerland) who are engaged in Asia (India and Mynamar), Africa (Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Tanzania and Chad) and Latin America (Ecuador, Colombia and Nicaragua). SWISSAID supports "self-help projects" for indigenous population groups by exclusively employing local experts (SWISSAID, n.d. c). In Switzerland, SWISSAID focuses on a sensitisation of society for solidarity. It pressures and supports concrete policy alternatives, such as the Fair Trade movement, and tries to improve the awareness of using natural resources intelligently and carefully (SWISSAID, n.d. d).

Fastenopfer - Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund (AS network)

In 1961, Fastenopfer was established by the youth organisation of the Swiss Catholic Church. After it underwent a development process, the organisation became a non-governmental organisation (NGO) of the Swiss Catholic Church – it nowadays employs approximately 50 people in Lucerne, Lugano and Lausanne (Schweizerische Kirchenzeitung, 2004; Fastenopfer, n.d. b). Fastenopfer is mainly funded from donations and legacies and has a project volume of CHF 20.2 million (Fastenopfer, n.d. b). The Catholic organisation aims at strengthening local village structures and promotes self-empowerment in 14 countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Its core concerns centre on faith and justice, food sovereignty and human rights. In Switzerland, Fastenopfer aims at sensitising the Swiss population for disadvantaged countries in the South (Fastenopfer, n.d. a).

Bread for all (AS network)

Bread for all is the Development Service of the Protestant Church of Switzerland. The NGO has been founded in 1961 and employs 35 staff in Berne. The annual funding contributions are approximately CHF 17 million (Bread for all, 2010b). Bread for all supports about 350 development projects and programmes in 55 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The organisation aims at empowering people in the South to free themselves from poverty and dependency by supporting projects of different NGOs. It focuses on issues such as civil and political rights, gender equality, education, health, food, environment and peace (Bread for all, 2010a). In Switzerland, Bread for all lobbies governmental authorities, parliaments and the economic sector in order to promote a more equitable and sustainable development framework. It also engages in public sensitisation through its annual ecumenical campaigns (ibid.).

Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation (AS network)

The largest Swiss NGO in the field of development cooperation, Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation (hereinafter called "Helvetas"), is the result of a merger of Helvetas and Intercooperation in 2011. Helvetas is organised as an association and employs 140 staff members in Berne, Zurich, Lausanne and Balerna. Helvetas is engaged in 32 countries in Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern Europe and cooperates with 1200 local staffs. (Helvetas, n.d. a). Helvetas' project volume amounts to CHF 110 million. Projects are aimed at disadvantaged people living in rural areas. The organisation offers services in six different fields of development work, such as infrastructure (water and sanitation, water for food, bridges and roads), environment (soils, forests, water and energy), rural economy (food, organic farming and fair trade), education, knowledge and learning, and peace and governance. Besides these core projects, advisory services are offered to local NGOs and governments (Helvetas, n.d. b). In Switzerland, awareness-raising is part of the task portfolio of the organisation, in order to persuade citizens to support development cooperation endeavours as well as to influence development policies in Switzerland (Helvetas, n.d. a).

Caritas Switzerland (AS network)

Established in 1901, Caritas Switzerland belongs to Caritas Internationalis – a network of 162 CSOs which are active in over 200 countries all over the world. It is an independent Catholic aid agency with an annual budget account of around CHF 95 million (Caritas, n.d. a). Solidarity, justice and peace, the respect of peoples' individual rights and their inalienable dignity guide Caritas' work (Caritas, n.d. b). Caritas Switzerland focuses worldwide on empowering disadvantaged people. Focus lies on food security, water supply, human rights, disaster aid, climate protection and disaster prevention (Caritas, 2013b). In Switzerland, Caritas is engaged with issues, such as poverty, integration, asylum and refugees, mountain action and disaster relief. The organisation attempts to integrate weaker groups into the community by means of awareness campaigns, advisory services and cooperation with other CSOs (Caritas, 2013a; Caritas, n.d. b).

HEKS - Interchurch Aid (AS network)

HEKS, which stands for Swiss Interchurch Aid, was established by the Swiss Reformed churches in 1946. It served the purpose to support sister churches in war-torn Europe until the organisation shifted its focus from Europe to the world in the 1969s (HEKS, n.d. a). Since 2004, HEKS is organised as a trust with around 240 full-time employees and over 450 part-timers, working in 21 key countries (HEKS, n.d. b). The organisation's project volume accounts for CHF 53,4 million. HEKS follows a mission for "a more humane and a more equitable world" (HEKS, n.d. c). Projects focus on "development of rural communities, the promotion of peace and conflict resolution, interchurch cooperation and humanitarian aid" (HEKS, n.d. b). In Switzerland, the activities of HEKS encompass "social integration, advocacy for asylum seekers, and the socially disadvantaged" by means of legal aid, lobbying, awareness building and language courses (ibid.).

Enfants du Monde

Founded in 1968 and based in Geneva, Enfants du Monde (EDM) is a Swiss NGO with an annual budget of around CHF 4.5 million (Enfants du Monde, 2012; Enfants du Monde, n.d. b). The organisation is active in Burkina Faso, Niger, Bangladesh, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and Haiti with 12 education and health projects benefiting 85'000 children (Enfants du Monde, n.d. a). EDMs goal is to "help and protect disadvantaged children in poor countries by offering them a quality education and access to health services" (Enfants du Monde, n.d. b). The organisation works together with 15 local and international partner organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) or UNICEF, as well as local universities and schools, training teachers and health workers to improve educational and health standards in a sustainable manner (ibid.). In Switzerland, EDM tries to raise awareness among young people about the living conditions in underprivileged countries and how important the access to education and medical care is. To this end, exhibitions, events, educational programmes and networking activities are offered (ibid.).

Better Aid

Launched in 2008, Better Aid comprises over 700 CSOs worldwide that are engaged in development issues. The umbrella organisation challenged the aid effectiveness agenda and advocated a more encompassing agenda focusing on development effectiveness (which was finally acknowledged in the Busan HLF). Better Aid is an open platform that coordinates many CSO activities. It was actively engaged in the preparation process of CSOs in the lead up to the Busan HLF (i.e. in the form of monitoring, consultations and studies). Participating CSOs strive to "deepen aid and development effectiveness" (Better Aid, n.d.). To this end, Better Aid issued position and policy papers and promoted their messages both nationally and internationally (ibid.). The organisation is managed by the Better Aid Coordinating Group (BACG), which consists of 35 CSOs – divided into working groups –, two co-chairs (Antonio Tujan and Mayra Moro-coco) and a facilitation group of five (Tujan, 2012).

In December 2012, Better Aid announced its dissolution due to the agreement that a new open platform[4] for development effectiveness will be created, which brings "together other platforms and CSOs initiatives, most especially the Open Forum" (the Open Forum will discussed in detailed in the next section of this paper) (ibid.).

After the provision of background information on interviewed CSOs, the paper now turns to the Open Forum and post-Busan CSO integration. Major accounts of this section are based on the insights gained during conducted interviews – henceforth the necessity of having firstly introduced these interview partners.

3.   Civil Society Engagement in the Development Cooperation

The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness

The OECD defines civil society organisations as "the multitude of associations around which society voluntarily organises itself and which represent a wide range of interests and ties. These can include community-based organisations, indigenous peoples' organisations and non-government organisations" (OECD, 2007). In light of the scope of this paper, major focus with regard to CSOs will lie on non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This narrowing down is justifiable as NGOs indeed form major part of the whole CSO body (Krut, 1997, p. 11)[5].

According to the Union of International Associations, NGOs increased in number from 985 in 1956 to over 27,000 in 2005. Even though these numbers only reflect the amount of international NGOs, it clearly displays a general trend (Reimann, 2006, p. 45).

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[4] The new, Post-Busan, platform, called CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), combines Better Aid and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness under one roof. It aims to unite CSOs from all over the world on the issue of development effectiveness in the wake of the commitments expressed at the Busan HLF (Moro-coco, 2012).

[5] Sometimes these terms are even used interchangeably. However, it is not the aim of this work to enter the debate centring about the definition of these terms (Krut, 1997, p. 11).

Due to the sheer number of NGOs/CSOs, it does not come as a surprise that umbrella organisations, attempting to coordinate and unite the work of individual CSOs, were created. On the international level, the most prominent and influential CSO formation is the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (hereinafter called "the Open Forum"). Established in 2008, it was created as a reaction to the exclusion of CSOs in the Paris Declaration. The Open Forum roots in the temporary ad-hoc Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, whose aim it was to create a formal link between CSOs and the OECD (and thus the High Level Forums). This ad-hoc body triggered the formulation of a common understanding and recognition of CSOs as part of the international development system. The Advisory Group was initiated by the BACG, which is currently co-chaired by Antonio Tujan. In 2008, the Advisory Group, due to the peculiarity and uniqueness of CSOs as development actors, expressed the necessity of the establishment of a permanent body that represents and coordinates development efforts of CSOs. As a result, over 70 CSO representatives decided in Paris to create the Open Forum to develop a suitable CSO effectiveness framework.

Under the supervision of this Open Forum, and in consultation with thousands of CSO representatives, the so-called Istanbul Principles were developed. They form the basis for the development effectiveness of CSOs. These eight principles are:

1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice
2. Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girls' rights
3. Focus on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation
4. Promote Environmental Sustainability
5. Practice transparency and accountability
6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity
7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning
8. Commit to realising positive sustainable change (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2010).

During a second meeting of the Open Forum Global Assembly, which took place in Siem Reap, Cambodia in 2011, the International Framework for CSO development effectiveness was endorsed.

This political document, on the one hand, supplements and complements the Istanbul Principles and, on the other hand, communicates the need for an enabling environment for all development actors. The International Framework also constituted the heart of the joint CSO strategy at the Fourth HLF in Busan (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, n.d.). Concurrently, the Open Forum triggers the implementation of the Busan commitments, including the Istanbul Principles and the Siem Reap Framework. In this process, it will also take governments and international development partners into account (Tujan, 2013).

Civil Society Criticism and Improvement Suggestions for the Busan Partnership

Even though paragraph 22 of the Busan Partnership states that "CSOs play a vital role in … shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation", CSOs are not completely satisfied with the outcomes of the Fourth HLF (Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011, p. 6). Firstly, it is criticised that the Busan Partnership, due to the absence of strict timelines and targets to overwork the unfinished agenda, is not concrete enough (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2012, p. 1).

Secondly, Nina Schneider from AS stressed that the engagement of the private sector (as well as the BRICS[6]), limits the possibilities for CSOs and even results in ambivalence vis-à-vis development effectiveness. The reason for this is the different approach of these actors (i.e. they focus more on profitability and economic growth and less on humanitarian aspects) (Schneider, 2013). Thus, the Open Forum demands that the private sector should have the duty to contribute to development outcomes (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2012, p. 1).

Thirdly, and in a similar vein, the engagement of the BRICS on the donor side also shifted the angle of the international community's main driver for development from human rights to growth (ibid.).

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[6] Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, formerly on the recipient side of development aid, become increasingly more important as donors.

Anne-Sophie Gindroz states that the development from Accra to Busan can henceforth even be considered to be a step back (at least with regards to human rights). Among the new (southern) donors, the principle of non-interference exists. Consequently, they aim to avoid tackling the issue of human rights (especially because some of the new donors themselves are not too sensible with their citizens' rights either). Instead, the southern donors focus on economic or business development (Gindroz, 2013).

Fourthly, a general concern exists that the Busan commitment to create an enabling environment for CSOs will not result in an accountability framework through which CSOs can tangibly act against government abuse of freedoms (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2012, p. 1). Carlo Santarelli, secretary general of EDM, for example also criticises that in many partner countries neither his organisation, nor any other CSOs are credibly taken into account by local governments (Santarelli, 2013).

Lastly, the Open Forum is concerned about the decision during the Busan HLF to postpone the implementation of an accountability framework for agreed commitments. CSOs demand an ambitious monitoring framework as well as country indicators in order to ensure that all actors fulfil their commitments (ibid.). This short overview shows that CSOs are not completely convinced by the Busan outcomes and that much (more) has to be done to ensure the smooth and effective integration of CSOs in the international development community. That CSOs are not everywhere integrated to a sufficient degree is also backed by a report from the OECD, which will be introduced below.

Cooperation between States and Civil Society Organisations

In its monitoring paper „Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration", the OECD (2011) postulates that the extent to which CSOs are integrated in development policy processes in partner countries is diverse (OECD, 2011, p. 35). Evidence is based on the replies to an optional survey module on inclusive ownership with 14 respondents. While, for example, in Nepal, Mali or Togo CSOs where integrated into the development process to a large extent, in other countries CSOs "were not invited to consultations, or they felt that their contributions were disregarded" (ibid., p. 35).

This is also backed by the interviewees of this paper. Santarelli mentions that the integration of CSOs is highly contextual. While it works fairly well in some countries, the Busan commitments did not bring about any changes for CSOs in others (e.g. Bangladesh) (Santarelli, 2013). Moreover, in a variety of cases, CSOs lack sufficient resources or efficient governance in order to actively participate in the development process. However, in general there is a positive trend towards deeper integration of CSOs: Respondents in six countries maintained that CSO "participation in the national development strategy is now stronger than in the past, and only one considered that it is becoming weaker" (OECD, 2011, p. 35). Even though, the sample was limited in size (and on a voluntary basis), the OECD stipulates that other sources tend to confirm this mixed picture of progress (see e.g. Meja, 2011 or Pereira, 2011) (ibid., p. 36).

The extent of CSO involvement does not only differ among countries, but also between sectors. While improvements in the engagement of CSOs in the realm of health, agriculture or education can be noted, "several studies and reports express concerns about a tendency in some countries to limit space for CSOs … who monitor government development policies and practices, seek to influence these policies, or defend human rights" (for detailed results see e.g. Act Alliance, 2011 or Tiwana and Belay, 2010) (ibid., p. 36). In summary, evidence shows that results regarding the creation of an enabling environment for CSOs are mixed. In many cases CSOs are not adequately funded and sometimes their access to the development process is even actively blocked by governments. However, successful contribution of CSOs to development processes is key in resolving the unfinished agenda. This is especially true with regards to ownership. As a next step, the paper will thus turn to this issue in order to exemplify the inevitability of CSOs regarding the ownership principle. In this regard, mutual accountability and the use of country systems will also be illuminated as they serve as vital building blocks for country (or democratic) ownership.

4.   Enhancing Development Effectiveness

The Ownership Principle

In Paris, ownership was placed on the effectiveness agenda for the first time. The intention was to include government leadership, respectively national development agendas and policies, to foster self-induced and committed development endeavours (OECD, 2009b, p.33). With the HLF of Accra, the term ownership was concretised and has been made more inclusive by adding a democratic dimension involving parliaments and other entities such as citizens and CSOs into the process – the so-called country or democratic ownership evolved[7] (Gindroz, 2013; Schneider, 2013). In the preparation process of the HLF4 in Busan, critical voices demanded Accra commitments to be articulated more precisely by defining clear objectives and indicators to analyse parliamentary and CSO participation, in order to strengthen democratic ownership (EDD, 2011). It is in this light, that the importance of democratic ownership has been spelled out in Busan by agreeing that governments, parliaments, citizens and CSOs should shape the development agenda by strengthening the principle of democratic ownership.

The practical implementation of pursuing the concept of ownership implies that donors do not pursue their own agendas but instead focus on supporting and strengthening the development agenda that has been developed in and by the partner country (in conjunction with local parliaments, CSOs, citizens and other important domestic development actors) (Gindroz, 2013).   A recent study by European Development Days (EDD)[8] states that only 2% of received monetary aid flows pass through parliamentarian processes (EDD, 2011). Schneider states that the discussion about democratic ownership is controversial and ambiguous. On the one hand, principles are in place and stipulated for but, on the other hand, the behaviour of influential states and organisations is diverse.

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[7] Note that governments mainly speak about country ownership, while CSOs prefer the term democratic ownership.

[8] EDD, organised by the European Commission, is Europe's main forum on international affairs and development cooperation (EDD, n.d.).

As long as influential international organisations, such as the IMF or the WB, base their development commitments on conditionality, democratic ownership cannot be attained (Schneider, 2013). The plane fact that democratic ownership is not yet fully implemented bears strong implications for donors, governments, parliaments and CSOs:

Donors still attempt to pursue their own agendas and priorities by tying provided aid to conditions, thereby serving their own interests rather than the partner country in question (Schneider, 2013). In practice, donors follow a strategy of influencing partner countries via the provision of technical assistance in implementation processes or expertise. Firstly, the provision of expertise itself stands in contrast with the idea of democratic ownership due to the endowment of Western "experts" within the partner countries. Often these experts are biased in favour of their employers (i.e. the donor country) (Gindroz, 2013; Schneider, 2013). Secondly, donors try to bypass local parliaments simply by addressing governmental ministries or large NGOs directly and asking them to implement their (the donor's) strategies. The reasons why donors undermine the ownership principle are manifold. Among others, concerns of losing influence in a partner country or mistrust in local institutional frameworks (e.g. fear of corruption) are decisive factors. To overcome these issues of undermining the partner's agenda, paradigmatic shifts in the North have to take place – aid has to become more transparent and predictable (EDD, 2011). To stimulate such a paradigmatic shift, interactions and dialogue with local governments has to be facilitated (Schneider, 2013; Santarelli, 2013). Additionally, partners' country systems and institutions have to be strengthened to overcome donor concerns inter alia with regards to corruption. To this end, parliaments and the civil society have to be integrated into decision-making processes. This way, checks and balances will be created – thus, strengthening the principle of mutual accountability is essential in this regard (OECD, 2009a, p.35; Schneider, 2013).

The enhanced and more inclusive position for *CSOs and parliaments*, fostered by the evolvement of the ownership principle, leads to more sustainable development outcomes but it also implies tasks and obligations for these "new actors" (Pereira, 2011, p.3).

By way of exemplification, CSOs must ensure that they effectively fulfil their role as interlocutor for the impoverished and marginalised sectors of society in order to achieve true democratic ownership (in cooperation with local parliaments) (Tujan, 2013). In this regard, information has to be made accessible to all people and in the appropriate languages. People have to be informed, in order to be able to participate in decision-making processes (Gindroz, 2013). It is also essential that CSOs and parliaments observe accountability and the participation process (Santarelli, 2013). In this respect, it is important that CSOs themselves struggle to broaden their scope of action – otherwise, if it is imposed from above, sustainability is not guaranteed. Context matters in this regard as CSOs have to develop national dynamics, which are adapted to local contexts in order to have an impact (Specker, 2013). Yet, as elaborately discussed above, CSOs and parliaments often lack capacities to pursue and contribute meaningfully to these tasks (Pereira, 2011, p.4f.). Thus, Santarelli for example demands that CSOs from the North should support CSOs from the South in the form of subsidies. Yet, sometimes there is no freedom of opinion, CSOs have no legal status or are even regarded by the government as belonging to the opposition (Gindroz, 2013; Pereira, 2011, p.5). Specifically in these instances, the commitment of fostering an enabling environment for CSOs has to be refined to a considerable extent.

As shown above, *partner governments* often struggle to endorse democratic ownership or to implement an enabling environment. Governments in partner countries often fear to lose their power positions if they accept (for instance) monitoring activities by CSOs. Therefore, they frequently try not to fully recognise CSOs as independent actors in democratic processes (Pereira, 2011, p. 4). Tujan states that CSOs consequently have to raise their voices step by step and to use every opportunity to promote the facilitation of democratic ownership by e.g participating in forums such as CPDE (Tujan, 2013). To support these development approaches, CSOs from the North have to enter into dialogues with both partner and donor governments to push for shifts (Santarelli, 2013). The process is demanding as it implies a vast extent of lobbying and networking but is ultimately inevitable to foster the (democratic) integration of CSOs in praxis (Schneider, 2013).

To sum up, even though in theory it is clear that sustainable development progress depends on the ownership of partner countries over their aid agenda, the actual extent of the application of the ownership principle is contested. In the words of Mrs Gindroz: "I don't think it [ownership] has changed a lot in this sense, it is still kind of superficial" (Gindroz, 2013). It is denotable in this regard that the efficiency of ownership is reinforced by and closely interconnected with both mutual accountability and the use of country systems – if they do not work efficiently, neither will ownership. Thus, as a next step, mutual accountability and the use of country systems will be illuminated.

Mutual Accountability

In tandem to the ownership principle, mutual accountability was also introduced as a guiding principle during the Paris HLF. According to Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights:

> a basic expression of mutual accountability is transparency. If a partner government knows what external resources are being added to its domestic resources, it can better plan and budget. Equally if a government is more transparent and includes its parliament and citizens in development decisions, it can achieve better development results and in turn provide donors with the confidence that resources are being used effectively (Mary Robinson, 2008, as cited in OECD, n.d. c).

Thus, following this definition, mutual accountability helps to foster the (democratic) ownership of aid by recipient countries. According to the OECD, CSOs are pivotal for the monitoring and reviewing of mutual accountability between the donor and the recipient (OECD, n.d. c, p. 2). It is thus instructive to assess whether (Swiss) CSOs are actually capable (and empowered) to fulfill their monitoring role.

In the words of Tony Tujan, accountability is not just between donors and partner countries but also includes the citizens in both countries (Tujan, 2013). Hence, he stipulates that participatory approaches have to be reinforced through the involvement of a variety of development actors in the formulation of plans and the assessment of progress (Tujan, 2013).

CSOs are key in this regard as they function as the cutting point between governments and citizens. Moreover, Mr. Tujan demands the development of a multi-stakeholder country framework to ensure the implementation of commitments and to hold development partners responsible for results (Tujan, 2013). Henceforth, in the eyes of the BACG chairman, some vital aspects are still absent on the international arena. Mr Santarelli, somewhat similarly, states that CSOs should have the capability to question their governments' strategy and efficiency to the same level the government is questioning the CSOs approaches. With specific regards to Switzerland, CSOs should submit reflections on the efficiency of programmes in recipient countries – especially on the collaboration with the partner government – so that the SDC can promote the creation of an enabling environment where it is (still) absent (Santarelli, 2013).

In a similar vein, Nina Schneider emphasises that mutual accountability goes hand in hand with empowerment of the civil society. It is in this respect that she stipulates that CSOs in the southern hemisphere need to overhaul in comparison to their northern counterparts. Workshops and trainings with special regard to monitoring in the South (whose prominence slowly increases) are essential in this regard. This process of capacity building has to be developed by southern NGOs themselves in order to better identify where resources of projects come from and whether they are effectively used. Ultimately this leads then to a better overview over the amount of projects and their necessity. Following from all this, AS demands from the SDC to invest in projects that strengthen the empowerment of the civil society. This way, southern CSOs could function as watchdogs in their countries. Thereby efficiency of projects and accountability between partners would be enhanced (Schneider, 2013). Helvetas, not surprisingly, agrees in many points with AS; It also demands a multilevel accountability approach in which civil society (as well as local parliaments) play pivotal roles. The overarching aim of mutual accountability lies in a more transparent and coherent aid agenda. This would ensure that those groups for who aid is intended are the actual beneficiaries (Gindroz, 2013).

Even though all interviewees came to somewhat similar conclusions with regard to the questions what the function of CSOs in the area of mutual accountability should be in theory, the interviews clearly show that CSOs often lack the capability to fulfil this function. One might thus conclude that the principle of an enabling environment is a huge progress in theory. In practical terms, however, it is often (still) absent. Henceforth, even though the varying extent is admittedly huge depending from case to case, it seems that CSOs often cannot fulfil their monitoring role to a satisfying extent (Santarelli, 2013).

The Use of Country Systems

With the Paris HLF alignment appeared on the aid effectiveness agenda. Among others, alignment entails the use and strengthening of a partner country's own system and procedures. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness stipulates that donors have to adhere to this principle to the largest possible extent when implementing aid. This is an important step in the direction of new ways of interaction between recipient and donor countries. To be specific, the use of country systems centres on the alignment of donor aid to the developing countries' own development plans and strategies, and tries to use and strengthen the partner country's institutions and available systems (Paris Declaration, 2005, Art. 17.) This includes a country's legal and institutional framework, comprising its national, sub-national, or sector based institutions and the related laws, regulations, rules and procedures (MCC, 2010, p.3). Country systems encompass (but are not limited to) public financial management, accounting, auditing, statistics, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring (OECD, 2009a, p.44). Resultantly, the intention of the use of country systems is to increase aid effectiveness by enhancing the partner's own capacity and capability to develop. Put differently, only by consolidating and utilising a partner's country systems does it become clear (i) where problems lie, (ii) how a country system has to function and, ultimately, (iii) what has to be improved in the system. Donor countries support this process by providing both financial resources and expertise – based on the articulated need of recipient countries.

The use of country systems is perceived as supporting the partner country's long-term sustainability, thereby enhancing the capacity to embed politics, parliaments, citizens and the civil society in the process of development. Thus, the use of country systems constitutes a shift from purely donor related strategies towards enabling a developing country to being in charge of its own aid agenda. This way, partner countries become responsible for the implementation and account of their policies towards citizens, parliaments and CSOs. It is exactly this responsibility that helps to foster and reinforce democratic ownership (Pereira & Villota, 2012, p.22).

The use of country systems can be advantageous in other instances too:

Firstly, according to Anne-Sophie Gindroz, the use and strengthening of partners' country systems is beneficial for all development actors as it leads to sustainability in the long run. She emphasises that a perfect process of using a country's own system would be reflected in a monetary provision of a recipient country's general budget on a central level. This support would then be channelled through the partner's own country systems in order to implement the development strategy. This way, the partner country could report through its own country systems to the donor. Ultimately, this process then (i) results in a reduction of the burden to implement development aid and (ii) reflects full aid alignment (Gindroz, 2013).

Secondly, the OECD states that aid, which is channelled through partner country systems, can provide incentives to strengthen institutional capacity and performance.

(i)   It can shift the focus of both donors and partners to strengthening the partner countries own systems, rather than developing parallel ones.

(ii)   It can lead to the implementation of widely accepted good practices (i.e. transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness) in partner countries.

(iii)   By using a partner's country system, domestic accountabilities between parliament, audit institutions, citizens and the ministry of finance can be strengthened (thus also leading to a greater transparency and comprehensiveness) (OECD, 2011, p.48).

Evidence shows that providing aid in a manner that uses and integrates country systems can lead to benefits ranging from better availability of information on aid flows and the improvement of inter-sectoral resource allocation in general. It may strengthen control and accountability of aid flows and therefore helping to improve the effectiveness of all public expenditure, not just that financed by aid. In aid-dependent countries, it can also have a catalytic effect on the strengthening of institutions, systems and democratic capacities to become independent and sustainable (OECD, 2011, p.49). Moreover, the use of country systems may provide incentives to strengthen the capacity and performance of the government and contribute to a more sustainable development outcome, because governments are becoming the real decision makers, which involves a higher level of commitment due to the assumption of their own responsibility (OECD, 2011, p.53).

In a variety of cases, however, donors fear financial misuse due to bad governance (i.e. paternalism or corruption) if they exclusively channel aid via country systems (Gindroz, 2013). In this regard, the question whether the use of country systems really is the most efficient way of providing aid also ascends among donors (OECD, 2011, p.48). This involves the problem of inefficient use of monetary flows due to weak institutional frameworks and democratic processes that imply a lack in monitoring and institutional challenges, including weak information management systems that hinder an effective collaboration across involved government departments (OECD, 2011, p.49; Gindroz, 2013). Where government systems are weak, donors have tended not to use the available systems but to set up parallel ones. This creates duplications and increases transaction costs, hampers alignment with country priorities and ownership, and constrains efforts to strengthen the national capacity building process (OECD, 2011, p. 52).

There are, however, suggestions to the solution of these problems:
Gindroz states that the use of a partner country's systems cannot be per se a requirement for donors from the outset. Instead, the use of country systems has to be perceived as an on-going process, where special emphasis has to be placed on the situational context of the partner.

If a country's systems are weak or non-existent, an efficient delivery of aid via the partner's systems is simply impossible. Such an on-going process has to foster a democratisation process, including good governance structures, a codetermination of the society and the inclusion of CSO actors. Civil society actors have to become active and raise their voices regarding bad government practices and nondemocratic outcomes (Gindroz, 2013). More concretely, if there is an issue with the governmental budget management, accounting and monitoring frameworks are needed to observe these budget processes. Therefore, capacities have to be built that allow for public scrutiny in order to observe inefficient governmental behaviour. This capacity building process will differ from case to case depending on the democratisation stage of the country, civil society activities and existing structures (Gindroz, 2013). Konrad Specker, head of institutional partnerships at the SDC, mentions in this context that it is important that CSOs develop their own capacity to be able to act as powerful and independent actors. Otherwise the process would not be sustainable (Specker, 2013). Overall it has to be recognised that achieving country ownership, supported by the use of country systems, should be based on an on-going democratisation process that allows the strengthening of CSO structures and public accountability in a sustainable manner (MCC, 2010, p. 4).

5.   Implications for the Swiss Development Cooperation and Concluding Remarks

In this final section, implications for the Swiss Development Cooperation will be elucidated and some concluding remarks will be issued.

How Swiss CSOs perceive the cooperation with the SDC

In general, AS and Helvetas state that the SDC has very committed employees. EDM adds that in Switzerland increasingly channels exist through which CSOs can communicate their perspectives on development issues (Santarelli, 2013). Henceforth, an active dialogue and exchange between CSOs and the governmental institution takes place. Schneider, Santarelli and Gindroz are all eager to deepen the cooperation with the SDC. They would thus welcome to set up more meetings in the future in order to intensify the contact and use synergies in order to create better outcomes (Schneider, 2013; Gindroz, 2013; Santarelli, 2013).

However, Gindroz also mentions that lately there are some worrisome aspects in the cooperation with the SDC: New accountability standards, which were implemented to hold partners accountable for the implementation of projects, tend to weaken the flexibility of CSOs. Gindroz claims that the reporting standards are too extensive as they focus too much on administrative processes. This way CSOs are prevented to tackle more fundamental issues. Gindroz stresses that the responsiveness and flexibility of a CSO should not be weakened. She, therefore, advocates a less technocratic cooperation approach that is more concerned with tangible outcomes, rather than administrative processes (Gindroz, 2013). Santarelli would appreciate it, if CSOs would be able to question the SDCs strategies, as well as submit reflections on the efficiency of the SDCs programmes as this would increase the effectiveness of the (Swiss) development cooperation (Santarelli, 2013).

Beside these concerns, Schneider would appreciate improving the domestic policy dialogue in order to foster a paradigm change in the mind-set of the Swiss population. This way awareness and solidarity in terms of poverty and development issues could be fostered in the Swiss society (2013).

On a global level, development cooperation is often used as a foreign-policy instrument of states. Governments can create policy dialogues with other states, where CSOs have no influence (Schneider, 2013; Gindroz, 2013). Swiss CSOs would thus appreciate to cooperate more intensely with the SDC in order to achieve their objectives in the South. Moreover, it would be desirable if the SDC would commit to the facilitation of an enabling environment on a global level (Schneider, 2013; Santarelli, 2013). This issue is connected with the level of cooperation of the SDC and Swiss CSOs abroad. Gindroz perceives the SDC's cooperation with CSOs abroad sometimes as ambiguous. On the one hand, the institutions are working together; Swiss CSOs implement projects from the SDC. Hence, both the SDC and CSOs face technically the same obstacles. On the other hand, the SDC is not able to use its position as a governmental institution to pressure via the policy dialogue to foster a stronger outcome because the institutional pressure hinders the local SDC employees to act. Gindroz mentions that up to a certain degree these facts are understandable, but that in areas where the Swiss government has no real interests, its scope of action should be better exploited to reach a level of a satisfactory outcome (Gindroz, 2013). To sum up, while within Switzerland a satisfactory degree of cooperation is reached, a more comprehensive dialogue between the SDC and CSOs is needed in the South.

Concluding Remarks

This paper tried to create a picture of the development cooperation and the integration and impact of (Swiss) CSOs therein. Interviews have been conducted to complement theoretical knowledge with practical insights. It was illuminated wherein the potential of a deeper integration of CSOs in development effectiveness policies lies.

To this end light has been shed on the ownership principle, mutual accountability and the use of country systems. It became clear that CSOs, functioning as the cutting point between governments and citizens, are key in enhancing aid effectiveness. By way of example, CSOs can function as monitoring agencies to both ensure that donor countries deliver aid predictably as well as that partner countries employ aid effectively and use it to achieve the goals agreed upon. Additionally, CSOs can function as the interlocutor of citizens and act as watchdogs with regards to the adherence of democratic processes (i.e. the integration of local parliaments when drafting the aid strategy). However, this paper also discovered that CSOs are often not as integrated into development processes as would be desirable. Oftentimes CSOs lack resources or are even systematically excluded by governments in order to prevent them to participate inter alia in the formation of policies. Even though the extent to which CSOs are integrated (or excluded) varies from country to country, it can generally be concluded that more has to be done with regards to the creation of an enabling environment for CSOs. This was also highlighted by this paper's interviewees – they all emphasised that they desire the SDC to behave more proactively on this issue vis-à-vis other development actors on the international arena.

It also has to be mentioned that, while conducting research for this paper, it became evident that many (Swiss) CSOs are not actively engaged with the aid effectiveness agenda. In a variety of cases CSOs either did not respond to interview inquiries or stated that they are not active in that area. This somewhat discouraging picture can at least partly be explained by the current omnipresence of the UN MDGs – the goals are expected to be fulfilled until 2015 and much has to be done since then. Henceforth, it seems likely that many CSOs are contemporarily more focused on achieving the MDGs than fulfilling the aid effectiveness agenda. Finally, further research should put emphasis on other aid principles (i.e. harmonisation and results) as well as illuminate CSO Post-Busan experiences in other countries – a task that was beyond the scope of this paper.

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